interview

• 
  Lev Kreft

LZ: What are the main characteristics and differences, with respect to the cultural (and artistic) production in the Balkan region, between the former “socialist” and today’s “capitalist” or neoliberal system? Can we speak about two (ideologically) opposed approaches and understandings – one that generates a kind of almost romantic idea of the “necessity” to create, “create in order to live”, and the other that produces the idea of “live in order to create” which sees the creative act as a task, work, craft? How does a particular political moment and social order influence (or how have they influenced) the shaping of specific cultural (and artistic) practices in the Balkans?

LK: Let’s start with what has remained unchanged and due to which, despite the passage from the self-governed cultural model to the neoliberal one, there has remained a certain similarity (especially in Slovenia) between the two that circumscribes them both: culture is a burden on the state, both financially and in terms of its program and policy. In the 1980s, we saw the emergence of numerous “independent producers”, although soon after they also became receivers of state funds. The fact is that the state notion of culture embraces all activities that cannot survive on the market, and those that may have the chance to survive on the market take shelter under the wings of the state, as well. “The cultural syndrome”, that is culture with the status of a substitute for the lacking political and state institutions in the period of a nation without a state, had already turned successfully into culture at the state’s expense in the period of socialism. If a state was not capable of bearing its own cultural burden, it would receive, for a short period of time, help from foreign countries, which are inclined to a (neo)liberal cultural policy. However, the (neo)liberal policy is two-fold: on the one hand, it emphasizes the importance of respect for human rights, of the rule of law and of the liberal democratic institutions of authority, and on the other, it lays stress on market relations, competition and, above all, the “invisible hand” that settles all agonisms and conflicts so as to suit all, or to the benefit of the community – without, for example, letting the state interfere excessively with culture. Neither was this second moment of cultural policy the result of the policy of donating; culture accepted the help of donators as a substitute for that of the state, which was busy at the time with other things or did not have enough money. With the donor funds for culture going down the drain, the desire and pressure were again oriented towards state institutions. Because these last only rarely, and never benevolently, give support to marginal and subversive cultural projects, and because state cultural institutions and their existence are always a priority, the character of culture always depended, and still depends, on the character of the state and its policy. In the past, the culture of state cultural institutions was socialist and self-governed, today it is liberal and nationalist. 

The liberal and nationalist culture is a hegemonic culture in the space of the Western Balkans because all of the new countries (or the rearranged old ones, as for example, Albania) are, by their constitutional order and political logic, liberal and nationalist: on the one hand, they swear by the “invisible hand”, even though here, in the Second World that has become the Third World, the “invisible hand” is a bit less latent, for this is first and foremost the hand of the West; and on the other hand, they swear by their blood and their soil. Such, too, is the major part of culture. These cultures exist in tension with each other, at times there is even conflict between the liberal-cosmopolitan and the nationalist cultures, and a segment of the culture exists that fails classification and therefore enjoys no real support either from the West or from its own country. This segment of culture rests on the premise of a practical and theoretical understanding of post-socialism and post-modernism in a post-socialist manner: in a time when differences are much discussed, there is in reality no difference at all. The choice between socialism and capitalism, between the party (totalitarian) state and the liberal democratic state in transition from one to the other represents by no means a radical choice. Even both cultures should be rejected at one time in order for the choice to be made. This holds well true: what choice is it between a nationalist culture that flatters the nation-state and its policies and a liberal culture that flatters the nation-state and its policies depends mostly on who governs the nation-state: the liberals or the nationalists (who are basically identical, and at times, even the same)?

As a result, support should be given to those cultural tendencies and currents which refuse to flatter anybody and which are disagreeable to donators and unfriendly towards the hand that feeds them. However, most valued in the Western Balkans are those who produce works and events instead of developing strategies and tactics to attract domestic and foreign supporters. Valued, therefore, are those who are willing to produce works and events without any support. These should be helped first, and only then, the others, if there is anything left. 

LZ: Who is to provide funds for the “independent” cultural and art scene in the long run if not the state? Is it not the case that all other financial support necessarily leads into commercialization and populism that consequently have an impact on the creativity process, the final product and its effect? Is it not the state’s “duty” to support culture and art? Why, for example, is it acceptable in the public discourse that the state approves a budget 10 times higher for the army than for culture and art?

LK: The independent culture cannot, of course, maintain its continual presence without support from outside resources – even more so as it has been without any support from the very beginning of its existence. But in order to maintain its independence, along with its continuity that demands raising funds from various resources, it has to develop specific strategies that are non-existent in Slovenia at present. All expectations are focused towards the state (and, in part, towards the local communities), for this is the only directly accessible resource and solution. Being dependent on this resource is no better than being dependent on the market. The solution is in the balancing of various resources which are, however, only accessible to the cultural sphere if it acts collectively, and not individually. A case in point of the fall off of resources is the bill about “little labor” that not only abolishes student labor and student services as state-independent resources, but also replaces both by a resource that depends on the executive state authority[1]. A number of cultural activities have maintained independence by counting simultaneously on the resources from both the government and student organization budgets. Independence is a game that involves at least two possible resources, while dependence presupposes one resource with a monopolistic position. Every monopoly, and this one is no exception, should be opposed, even though getting financing almost entirely from state resources has become self-evident. Commercialism is by all means a difficult thing, and being dependent on the nation-state budget may be far more difficult. It is not about what the state’s duty is – as we know, the state is not bound to do anything, not even act according to its laws – what we expect from the state is for it to behave properly. But, in the majority of cases, it fails to do so. The fact that Thatcher, for example, almost destroyed the alternative culture in England by abolishing financing is something that may happen at any moment. And it is not too much to say that, at the beginning, alternative culture was financed as well by important commercial sponsors, for example, British Petroleum and Marks & Spencer. The problem emerges when you are restricted to a one and only resource and are left with no space to maneuver, which means that you are caught in a situation of dependence. We experienced this when the Slovenian right wing took over the Ministry for Culture. Populism also involves cuts of resources for alternative culture and the enhancement of nationalist culture that may be (both of them) justified as a state’s duty.

LZ: How to achieve the ideal situation where “support should be given to those cultural tendencies and currents which refuse to flatter anybody and which are disagreeable to donators and unfriendly towards the hand that feeds them”, as you put it? Experience has shown that every “donator”, be it the state, an agency, an individual or an institution, expects a certain degree of loyalty. 

LK: As for loyalty: if a contract is fair, having both parties undertaking a commitment to each other, then loyalty is but the fulfillment of such contract. However, if getting a contract involves flattering, this also makes up a part of the tactics and strategy that allows one to buy his/her possibility to work. I know just as many cases in which the carriers of cultural projects had to succumb to politics or become commercialized, as I know opposite cases in which they, without scruples, screw the funders. I guess the right tactic would be something in between, which means that there is someone who sees the significance and the aim of the project and of the whole orientation. To have someone funding demonstrations against himself – I hope there is no one from the alternative culture expecting this to happen. The problem is that neoliberal cultural policy is more and more grounded in the radical conservative ideology, in moralizing about values and similar bullshit. It is therefore all the more important to invent and develop methods to become independent from the nation-state, and from the EU as well, which is becoming ever more ossified, demanding at the same time a more and more “glorifying culture” that is completely at the service of ideology. The question is therefore political: Is a cultural sector that has, as a result of the changes in the cultural policies, hit upon a “black zone” of the ruling cultural ideology willing to engage politically in order to change the policies? Or does it prefer to adapt to them and do what is pleasing at the moment? The answer is far from easy, for it implies the decision about one’s own creative destiny. However, who risks does not fail, while who submits has less possibilities to survive. What should be studied are the wave of attacks on the independent alternative culture in the USA at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, which at first was very successful and dangerous, but later came across a well-organized resistance. The USA invests little in culture, but it joins funds with sponsors and is considered a kind of indicator showing to sponsors and donators where to invest. In addition (which is blasphemous to say), it is quite right that every five years there comes a wave of selection which sweeps away a part of the cultural production, for those who persist are those who stay in the game for a reason beyond mere survival at the margin. In culture, quantity does not generate quality, but covers and eclipses it.

LZ: Why is the cultural (and artistic) production of the so-called “East” (the Balkans) in the so-called “West” successful only, or chiefly only, if it reproduces stereotypes and generalized ideas produced by the so-called “West” about the so-called “East”? In particular, I have in mind the thematization of the critique of socialism/communism as totalitarianisms of a closed-end type that some cultural workers (artists) have not been able to recognize as such in the so-called “West” and therefore have experienced the so-called “West” as liberation, along with the problematic concepts produced by it: neocolonialism, neo-racism, multiculturalism, integration, democratization… In a way, by choosing to criticize the so-called “East”, these creative people have chosen the easier and safer path.

LK: The question is a rhetorical one. Nevertheless, the answer calls for a slight variation of expression. In the West, successful are those who represent the “Balkan” art that tallies with the stereotypes, and as well those who don’t care about their origin and bring out a completely international production. And this is what the global cultural industry needs: firstly, the art of national diversification that can no longer rest on folkloristic elements, for not even ethnologists any longer care about the folklore, and therefore such art rests much more explicitly on the Western stereotypes about global differences; and secondly, the art of the international and everywhere identical artistic production of the generally trivial artistic commodities and events. Many pass the boundary from the national stereotype into international art. Marina Abramović is one such case, especially now that, in “taking her leave” and having retrospectives of the last fifteen years, she is being recycled into international art. However, these artists and groups cannot be said to have perceived the West as liberation. Quite the contrary, they have seen the Balkans as a lost case without the West being a liberation, and they have broken through because of the charge that is a result of their position, and then passed – which comes as no surprise – on to the safe road of the West. It holds particularly true for NSK (and Irwin, as well), for the Russian socialist realism art, and for a short period, also for the Chinese socialist realism art, that they have tried to sell to the West the stereotypical Easternality more in the form of totalitarianism than barbarism, which is the usual stereotypical image of the Balkans. However, more typical than the story of Irwin is the story of Komar and Melamid, from the neo-avantgarde – ‘68 conceptualism to socialist realism art from the beginning of the 1980s, the selling of socialist realism art in the West throughout the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, subversion at the expense of the West in the 1990s and finally – portraits of rappers on the one hand, and psychedelic oriental cosmism on the other. Involved is the difference that is a result of the fact that some artists and art groups, from the Balkans as well, move to the metropolises of cultural industry in order to succeed, to be in the center of life and power, or simply because they have been given the chance and for them there can be no worse place than their own home. While others can’t imagine, not even in the global era, to live anywhere else but here, at home, from where they direct their international careers. Who among the two is best selling the Balkan stereotypes? As already said, the Balkan stereotype is neither East nor socialism. The Balkan stereotype is barbarism and to this designation Emir Kusturica and the cinematography of the Balkan wars suit better than anyone else possibly could.

LZ: How is it with all this today? What specific art practices can you detect in the Balkans and how would you comment on them?

LK: In the Balkans, it is just the same as everywhere else, nothing special. The differences may be found in the perception and self-perception, in stereotypes and the like. A hundred or so years ago, the Belgrade October Art Saloon or U3, the Slovenian Triennial of Contemporary Art, would have been regarded as some kind of upstart event striving to show to the Western gaze its own pro-Westernality so explicitly as to reach the point of poor taste. Today, these events are as equally distasteful as they are elsewhere, including the metropolises, and we can’t object to them in any way as ours is a second-class position: these events are first-class but often tasteless in terms of ideology, but such is the global way of doing things. However, these events are no worse than anywhere else and I think this is the main catch of the contemporary situation. What the Balkans is better for than the West is can be seen with the naked eye: here you must think in order to survive. What I would like to say is that you can’t survive in culture if you do not think damn well – not only the most gifted survive, but first and foremost, the most intelligent, the well-versed, clever, cunning, artful. And the Balkans abounds with such intelligent, well-versed, clever, cunning, artful cultural production, while such production is dwindling in the West. Culture is no different than other industries: the West lacks in people who will do certain work and therefore it imports some and employs the others, depending on its needs and the needs of the local context of the “imported” employee. And then present this as a Western aid to the poor black people, even though these last produce according to Western requirements and for the Western audience.

LZ: How have the brutal invasion of neoliberalism into the so-called “East” and the complete domination of the neoliberal model of functioning of society influenced the development – and the emergence! – of the art system in the Balkans? Has the establishment of the neoliberal model of governance and controlling of creativity (art system) somehow paralyzed the “immaculate” purity of artistic creation in the Balkans? This purity was cut out as a result of the Iron Curtain, but also protected, “autochthonous”, independent and unique (along with its good and bad features). 

LK: What needs to be said first and foremost is that (neo)liberalism is the outcome of the Balkan dreams, and not some kind of forced colonization. These dreams were in particular dreamt in the sphere of culture from the 1960s on and became the official ideology way before 1990: management instead of planning, sovereignty instead of self-government, shelves full of articles instead of leveling of wages, social difference instead of social solidarity, nationalist culture instead of brotherhood and unity … These are not the watchwords of a colonial conqueror, but a wish of the natives to be colonized. And this wish came true. There is no better illustration than what occurred in the school curriculum of art. In Yugoslavia, school curricula were accepted at the level of republics and regions, and therefore they were (multi)nationally nuanced and very different, while at the same time they all envisaged an equal overview of the national (Yugoslav) and global culture. Today, every nation-state has its own curriculum, which are as like as two peas for they follow the same basic pattern: national culture and again national culture and then just a little bit of global culture. If today the Balkan people studied on the basis of the old study curricula instead of the new ones, all citizens of the newly created states, cultures and nations would gain the mastery of all the conditions these new states are demanding from foreigners – they would give proof of their cultural unity by knowing the cultural and political history of a particular state. All of them would have enough knowledge to pass the exams that the new states pose as a condition, among others, for receiving their national citizenship. That the world, including the European Union, has a colonial order and that the Balkan nations are not the metropolises of capital does not mean that they have been “occupied”. They occupied themselves, and culture had a major role in this process. The alternative culture is deemed to be no less innocent.

LZ: How is an artist/cultural worker supposed to survive in the ideological struggle (Rancière), the struggle for power (Bordieu) against curators/managers=bureaucrats, directors and employees of cultural institutions that see the artist and the work of art above all as a design (product) of their own ideology of the art system? Art fairs are perhaps the best illustration of this process where the art work takes on all the elements of a commercial item. 

LK: I am not an artist, or better, I was an artist for a very short period of time at the beginning, but I was never professionally dependent on art. However, at the personal level, it is most important, whether what’s involved is a “totalitarian” or “commercial” regime, to have many professions and not only one, which also means that you feel having a vocation for many things and so you “rotate crops”, partially as a result of your own decisions, partially as a result of the change of climate. This brings forth migrations, being active simultaneously in many fields and fronts and also a real possibility not to lose or find repulsive of all them at once. “To live for art” is a pathetic phrase, but to live only and alone from art projects is far more pathetic, even if this is done in the name of the alternative and the alternative understanding of art and culture. As to what concerns curators, etc., one should know, as it is customary in every fight of ideology and with power, how to distinguish between the enemies and their fighting forces. To set as one’s main task the fight with the police is a stupidity – the police in the streets consist of people who are just doing their job and are not carriers of power. And despite the fact that curators look like carriers of power who deny entry into institutions, they are not more than street police. To make the central struggle out of the fight with them is a mistake. The police are there to collaborate with, to find a common language to enable communication with, and only now and then to throw stones against, knowing, however, that victory over them brings nothing. As for the ideological struggle, much more than Rancière, I value Gramschi and his approaches that allow for the recognition of the political as conflict and conflict as the most precious relationship, as it is the only one that leads to the political, to the struggle for and against hegemony, and into a good connection between art/culture – science – politics.

LZ: What do you think will be the influence of the newly established BIFC regional hub in Ljubljana?

LK: No one has timely thought out this initiative for collaboration from the aspect of creating compatibility. The European Cultural Foundation has a role in this game because the Balkans have always been in its hands, and it has organized all kinds of meetings and events that have come close enough to the margin, but have never exceeded it – it is therefore a politically correct institution, and it is politically correct as well towards the Balkans and nothing more than that. The Open Society Institute does not set as its goal art and culture, rather its purpose is to maintain the ideology of an open society in the environments that are prone to totalitarian solutions, in particular to the disrespect of human rights and civil freedoms. Its main goal is the membership of the Balkans in the EU, and then it can be left to others. This is why investments in culture are coming with an ambition to support those EU forces that call for an accelerated integration of the Balkans into the EU and those Balkan forces that demand a quick Europeization. The OSI is determined whether its relationship towards the Balkans should be postcolonial or something other, and it differs from the EU-dependent institutions that always find themselves in this dilemma. The Republic of Slovenia is faced with its own cleft between the Foreign Ministry which advocates an accelerated enlargement and (but only because of Helena Drnovšek Zorko) a decolonial cultural policy, and the Ministry for Culture whose principle is to invest in foreign cultural projects only if Slovenian culture gains profit out of this and if this is supported by the general national interest. In the end, what counts is not what the policy is with which to address the BIFC, but to be present, to play an important part and not enter into conflict with other parties, particularly not with the EU. The average interest of the Slovenian state does not reach any further. When partners and funders are thus divided and are compelled to go on with the project because they invested in it, the real politics is to enable the BIFC regional hub to reach the highest possible degree of independence not with big watchwords and declarations, but with practical work. With such funders, the BIFC regional hub cannot be stopped given that all the financial and other reporting quotas are fulfilled. After discussions at the meeting[2] held in Ljubljana, I would say that this initiative for me is dead and nothing will come out of it. Not because it lacks funds, but because of the clash of the idea, for each partner has its own expectations and plans. I don’t believe the partners (the Ministry for Culture, ECF, OSI) could possibly join forces to form an efficient unit. If something will be done it will be done (and this is what we are already used to) against the will of the partners and funders. The funder’s initiative is dead. However, this does not mean that the inflowing money cannot be used more beneficially and better.

LZ: How are we, given the circumstances, to avoid the known EU agenda of “integration”, “approximation” and “civilizing” of the Balkans? Are we not talking about some kind of neocolonial position of EU towards the Balkans, in particular if we think about the rigorous visa system (that was not long ago partially, and only for some countries, abolished) that fails to allow the mobility of people (cultural workers, artists and their works) and promotes a neo-racist situation which contributes to the processes of production and maintaining of differences? Moreover, the provisions of some of the EU open calls in the field of culture and art (and science as well) in various ways posit the limits to the potential candidates from the Balkans, and are, at the same time, set mainly to raise awareness of the EU about the Balkans and vice versa, as if what were involved were an exotic, protected animal species and not a relatively small geographical space that shares a common history, culture and tradition. Are the Balkans aware of this? 

LK: The European Union needs to be shown again and again the story about its colonial prejudice, and the Western Balkans the story about its wish for someone from elsewhere to sit behind its neck. It is therefore not educative if the Balkan people are being told how Europe is colonizing them and it is even less educative if the European Union is being told about having a civilizing role in the Balkans. Educative are, at least in the sphere of culture, only slaps.

LZ: You have often proclaimed to be an advocate of the Balkanization of Europe and not for the Europeization of the Balkans. Could you elaborate on that further? 

LK: Today, stories about the Balkans not keeping abreast and about the progressiveness of the West are nonsensical talk that cannot be done away with other than by establishing an exchange – and exchange is, according to principles of capitalism, equal and equivalent. Since the Balkans want to become Westernized, then Europe, which is going to incorporate them, needs to be Balkanized. There is no other way. Anyhow, the Balkans and Western Europe will have to lose something if they are to embark on the path of integration in order to come together: which are a few prejudices, a few historical narratives of the one about the other and a few unpleasant customs on both sides. And then they have to integrate in Europe, both of them, the West and the Balkans. By the way, this is the European path.

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